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Abstract: A question that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of 
religion is how God would be able to effect a rational choice between two 
worlds of unsurpassable goodness. To answer this question, I draw a parallel 
with the paradigm cases of indifferent choice, including Buridan’s ass, and 
argue that such cases can be satisfactorily resolved provided that the 
protagonists employ what Otto Neurath calls an ‘auxiliary motive.’ I supply 
rational grounds for the employment of such a motive, and then argue against 
the views of Leibniz and Nicholas Rescher to show that this solution would 
also work for God.
2    A multiple-choice problem
     It has been urged by various thinkers that even if the notion of the best possible 
world is perfectly coherent, the term may not be applicable to merely one out of a 
presumed infinity of possible worlds. That is to say, the description ‘is unsurpassed in 
terms of merit’ may well have more than one referent from among the range of 
possible worlds that comprise God’s choice. Richard Swinburne, John Mackie, 
Michael Banner, Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz all advocate the view that if 
there is a limit to the merit a world can have, it is likely that there will be more than 
one world exemplifying that level of merit.1 Even Kant, during his early optimistic 
phase, realised that if there was an unsurpassable world from among all the possibles, 
it need not be uniquely so:
there is a possible world, beyond which no better world can be thought. 
Admittedly, it does not, of course, follow from this that one among all the 
possible worlds must be the most perfect, for if two of more such possible 
worlds were equal in respect of perfection, then, although no world could 
be thought which was better than either of the two, neither of them would 
be the best, for they would both have the same degree of goodness.2
Kant was thus quick to realise that if there were two or more unsurpassable worlds, 
each equal in perfection to the other, then neither could properly be called the best.3 
At first blush this might not seem like a particularly high price to pay, as presumably 
the optimist would just replace ‘best’ with ‘unsurpassable’ when describing the world 
God made. But the hypothesis that there are multiple unsurpassable worlds could 
potentially pose problems for the optimist beyond the inconvenience of not being able 
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God to act there must be an overriding reason for him to do so.4 And in this lies the 
nub of the difficulty of having more than one possible world of unsurpassable merit, 
for where two or more worlds recommend themselves to God equally there could be 
no overriding reason for him to choose one over the other(s). So a sort of divine 
paralysis is assumed, with God caught frozen between equally good alternatives and 
unable to make a choice between them.
     The issue in question—how God could make a choice in this situation—is thus 
akin to that of Buridan’s ass, the historical paradigm used to illustrate the difficulty of 
indifferent choice. Buridan’s ass is usually conceived to be in a state of hunger and 
standing between two haystacks, either side of it and at an equal distance away. As it 
has no overriding reason to move towards one haystack rather than the other it is 
assumed that the ass must fail to choose and thus starve to death whilst still in a state 
of indecision. The same type of paradox has historically been presented in many 
different ways, e.g. a choice between two roads of equal length to one’s destination 
(Buridan), a choice between two similarly appealing ladies of the court (Bayle), and 
more recently, a choice between two fresh dollar bills (Nicholas Rescher). Each 
example turns on precisely the same problem of making a choice without preference. 
How then best to solve it? We might suppose that Leibniz, as one of the few card-
carrying optimists in the history of philosophy, might have some useful words to say 
on the problem of choice without preference since it looms menacingly over all forms 
of optimism, including his own. But given the favour his philosophy accords to the 
principle of sufficient reason it is little surprise to find him affirming that in cases 
where a will is indifferent to the choices in front of it, it will not choose. He writes,
4Indifference is absolute when the will finds itself of the same mind in 
relation to each side, and is not inclined towards one more than the other... 
What point is there in fighting for these things which never exist? I do not 
think such indifference ever exists, or if it does exist, then as long as it 
remains no act will follow.5
And so, in the case of Buridan’s ass, ‘[i]t is true that, if the case were possible, one 
must say that the ass would starve to death.’6
     As Leibniz does not exempt God from the principle of sufficient reason, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that if there were two or more unsurpassable worlds he would 
have God fail to choose through lack of preference. This is confirmed in his Theodicy, 
where he informs us that ‘amongst an endless number of possible worlds there is a 
best of all, else would God not have determined to create any.’7 This remark is made 
in the context of there being an apex to the pyramidal series of possible worlds from 
which God makes his choice. Within this passage there is the deeper claim that there 
must be a single best world in order that God be moved to create anything. 
     A modern-day optimist considering how best to respond to the problem of 
indifferent choice will thus derive no comfort from Leibniz. And so long as the 
paradox of indifferent choice is treated as a strictly logical problem there can be no 
escape from the conclusion that the agent will fail to act. However, if the paradox is to 
be considered purely as a logical problem, then it is arguable that Buridan’s ass ought 
not to be considered as the paradigm example; a more appropriate illustration of 
indifferent choice would involve replacing Buridan’s ass with a robot, which is 
programmed to approach haystacks. Assuming the robot is able to measure distances 
to a very high degree of accuracy, and thus recognise haystack A and haystack B to be 
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approach either haystack. The robot follows only logic and it is its unswerving 
adherence to logic that prevents it from moving towards one haystack or the other. 
Yet we feel certain that no rational being would suffer the same fate—whether it be 
Buridan’s ass, a man, or God. So the question to be asked is: what is the difference 
between this example and the case of Buridan’s ass, or the person offered a choice 
between two fresh dollar bills, or God faced with two unsurpassable worlds? At first 
glance there seems to be nothing particularly different, as in each case the same two 
options are available to the chooser as they are to our robot, viz. choose one 
alternative or the other.
     Two alternatives, three choices
     But of course it is to oversimplify the matter to say that Buridan’s ass, for instance, 
is faced with just the two choices of haystack 1 and haystack 2, as there is a third 
option open to it as well, viz. starving to death whilst standing between the two. This 
is clearly not an option open to the robot as it does not, properly speaking, have the 
power to choose in the same way that a creature does.
     By extending the range of choices to three, I believe we have discovered the germ 
of a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of choice without preference. Before we 
develop this point further it is worth tackling an obvious objection to this extension of 
choices, the objection being that starving to death is not really a choice at all but the 
inevitable result of indecision over the two genuine choices available (eat haystack 1 
or eat haystack 2). If this is correct, then the ass doesn’t actually make a choice to 
starve, it just starves because of its failure to choose between haystacks.
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paths to starvation—choose it as an option in itself, or fail to choose between the two 
haystacks on offer. We may call starvation a genuine choice as the ass always has the 
option of starving to death if it so chooses, no matter how many haystacks surround it. 
If there was just the one haystack available to eat, it still has the choice of whether or 
not to eat it, and the same is true if there were ten haystacks in the vicinity, or a 
hundred, or any number you care to choose. It would be odd indeed to say that the 
choice to starve exists at every moment and in every scenario except for when it finds 
there are only haystacks (or other sources of food) equidistant from it. Starving is thus 
a genuine choice.8
     Now assuming the ass to be normal, i.e. that it is not bent on self-extinction, we 
can say with some confidence that it will reject the starvation option. It is, after all, the 
worst of the three choices open to it, and no rational being would freely choose what it 
considers to be worst option available. But once the starvation option is rejected, this 
seems to take us right back where we started, for now it is faced with the same two 
choices (haystack 1 or haystack 2) with which it has been presented throughout 
antiquity, and it is no closer to being able to decide between them. One might 
therefore wonder if it might just end up starving to death anyway, since it still lacks 
the means to make a choice.
     And indeed, if the ass fails to make a choice between haystacks it will starve to 
death. But if the ass were now to starve to death, by inaction rather than positive 
choice, then the crucial point to bear in mind is that it will have allowed to happen the  
very thing that it has decisively rejected. That this would not be rational should be 
clear enough, and no reasoning being would permit it to happen if it can possibly help 
it. For it would be the height of irrationality to allow the very state of affairs to come 
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outcomes.
     The point I am trying to make here is this: once we introduce a third choice 
(deliberately starve) the problem shifts from being a strictly logical paradox to a 
matter of rationality. We move from asking ‘what is the logical way to break the 
deadlock of indifferent choice?’ to asking ‘what is the most rational option available 
in these circumstances?’ This is without question a subtle shift in emphasis but an 
important one, and will require a little explanation.
     Paradoxes constructed along the lines of Buridan’s ass have traditionally been 
construed as straightforward logical problems. They involve the protagonist being 
placed in a very simple dilemma—select one of the alternatives, or fail to make a 
selection. The paradox assumes that in order to choose one of the alternatives the 
protagonist must have a sufficient (overriding) reason to do so. Being a free agent, 
this reason can only be found in the protagonist’s preference for one alternative over 
the other. Now in order for there to be such a preference there must either be a 
logically significant difference between the two alternatives, or the protagonist must 
at least perceive there to be such a difference. But of course in the state of affairs 
described by the paradox neither is the case. And as there is no logically significant 
difference between the two alternatives, and as the protagonist correctly perceives 
this, there will obviously be no sufficient (overriding) reason for preferring one 
alternative to the other.9 Consequently the only logically acceptable horn of the 
dilemma is to fail to make a selection. The failure to choose is not just the logical 
outcome of the paradox, however, but the only rational outcome too. For rationality—
quite literally ‘reasonableness’—requires that an agent have some reason for acting. 
And since it is assumed that this reason must be found in the agent’s preference, his 
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rationality require that the agent fail to choose. Thus the possible outcomes of the 
theoretical paradox of indifferent choice are as follows:
(1) Choose alternative A (irrational, as there is no sufficient reason to do so over 
alternative B)
(2) Choose alternative B (irrational, as there is no sufficient reason to do so over 
alternative A)
(3) Make no choice (rational, as there is no logically significant difference 
between A and B)
However it would be a mistake to assume that this analysis applies also to real-life 
forms of the puzzle, for in all real-life cases the puzzle can only arise as a direct result 
of a preceding choice made by the agent. Which is to say, in order to get to the point 
where the agent is actively faced with indifferent alternatives, he must have rejected 
the option not to bother with the alternatives in the first place. He could have opted 
not to engage the alternatives on the grounds that he was uninterested in what they 
had to offer. But if he is interested, and decides to engage with the alternatives, then 
the whole complexion of the puzzle changes, and the possible outcomes are now as 
follows:
(1) Choose alternative A (irrational, as there is no sufficient reason to do so over 
alternative B)
(2) Choose alternative B (irrational, as there is no sufficient reason to do so over 
alternative A)
9(3) Make no choice (irrational, since this leads to the agent bringing about (or 
causing to endure) a state of affairs that he has already rejected)
Thus option (3) changes from being the only rational outcome in the theoretical form 
of the puzzle, to being yet another irrational outcome in the practical form of the 
puzzle. Of course there is still no logically significant difference between A and B, 
and hence no sufficient reason for a preference, but that is no longer grounds for 
adopting the third option. In fact quite the opposite, as the agent now has sufficient 
reason not to adopt (3). Logically, of course, the agent must end up doing one of the 
three, as they exhaust his options and he cannot choose or fail to choose one of the 
alternatives. But the principle of sufficient reason demands that (1), (2) and (3) all be 
rejected, as there is no sufficient reason for an agent to opt for any of them. And 
where the principle of sufficient reason breaks down and leads to logical absurdity, as 
it does here, the agent can only have recourse to its less stringent counterpart, the 
principle of insufficient reason.10 Such a principle will allow the agent to select (1), 
(2) or (3) via a reason that would be considered unacceptable (insufficient) in normal 
circumstances, but is nevertheless perfectly acceptable in the highly unusual situation 
we are here discussing.
     So what are insufficient reasons? In almost every state of affairs we can conceive, 
we find that there will be competing reasons for action. These reasons typically vary 
in quality, so that there is, for instance, a reason for a man diagnosed with liver 
disease to cut down on his alcohol intake (as it will lead to a slowing of the disease’s 
progress), and a reason for him to become a teetotaller (as this will arrest the progress 
of the disease). Now although he may recognise that he has a reason to cut down on 
his alcohol intake, he also recognises that he has a better reason to become a 
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teetotaller. So the former reason is deemed insufficient for action, as a better reason is 
available. Insufficient reasons are thus grounds for action, but grounds that are 
ordinarily not considered good enough to prompt an agent to do that action because 
they are bettered by other reasons. In making this observation it is not my intention to 
stray from the widely accepted view that agents routinely act on the best reason 
available. Rather, I am attempting to show that usually there are other, lesser reasons 
on which action could be based if the agent is unable to act on the best reason, or if no 
best reason is available. In such circumstances these lesser reasons can be brought 
into play by the principle of insufficient reason to ensure that logical absurdity does 
not arise as a result of there being no sufficient reason to either do A or not do A.
     Returning, then, to the main argument, we can be sure that the principle of 
insufficient reason will not lead an agent to option (3) as that option has already been 
rejected. So it must lead the agent to opt for (1) or (2). It can only do this by ignoring 
the fact that there is no logically significant difference between A and B, and thus 
allowing the agent to make a choice between them without requiring that such a 
difference be found. It is important to note that this does not mean that the agent can 
turn his back on rationality altogether and select one of the alternatives without any 
reason at all. There must still be a reason, it just need not answer to the description of 
‘sufficient’.
     Thus once an agent has decided to engage in an indifferent choice situation, what 
he requires is some way of breaking the deadlock that doesn’t simply involve making 
an irrational reason-less choice between whatever alternatives are on offer (which is 
presumably impossible anyway). In other words, what he requires is a means of 
selection that cannot be traced back to his will, thus absolving him of any charge of 
irrationality, but is nevertheless connected to him in that he accepts whatever selection 
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is made on his behalf. Thus the only choice he will make in the situation is to let an 
external means of selection decide which alternative is to be favoured over the other. 
At this stage all we can say is that such a means of selection will be external to the 
agent, and thus external to his will.
     Clearly, anything that fits the bill will not be as rational as making a choice based 
solely on sufficient, overriding reasons, which is how agents usually act. But in the 
circumstances it will be the most rational way to proceed, as the other ways are (a) to 
choose an alternative without any reasons at all, or (b) to fail to choose and thus allow 
a state of affairs to arise that one has already rejected. Since neither of those are in any 
way rational it must be that any method of effecting a solution that involves at least 
some modicum of rationality (or rather, is at least not wholly irrational) will be the 
most rational thing to adopt in the circumstances. So what is the method that allows 
an agent to break out of an indifferent choice situation with his rationality intact?
Auxiliary motives
To break the deadlock in such circumstances Otto Neurath suggests that one should 
employ what he calls an ‘auxiliary motive.’11 Neurath conceives this as a procedure 
that in no way alters the circumstances responsible for the deadlock, but will 
nevertheless assist in bringing the matter to a swift and successful close (thus 
functioning as ‘an aid to the vacillating, so to speak’). Neurath suggests that ‘The 
auxiliary motive appears in its purest form as a drawing of lots,’ and elsewhere 
implies that tossing a coin is also adequate for the purposes of a swift resolution.12 A 
very similar suggestion is also made by Nicholas Rescher—apparently independently
—at the end of his paper surveying the history of Buridan’s ass and the associated 
family of paradoxes. Rescher also urges that the deadlocked chooser should 
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implement a selection policy that is ultimately underpinned by randomness, for 
‘Random selection is the only reasonable procedure for making choices in the face of 
symmetric preference.’13
     I am inclined to agree, as a random selection procedure meets the requirements I 
laid down earlier, namely that the actual selection must be made by something 
external to the agent in order to protect the agent from the charge that he acted 
irrationally, i.e. without reason. To be sure, the result of a random process doesn’t 
afford the most rational reason for decision-making—it is not the sort of thing on 
which a rational being would ordinarily base his decisions after all—but in the 
circumstances we are considering, where the agent is deadlocked by two equally 
attractive alternatives, it is the most rational way of resolving the matter. Provided that 
the agent has got himself into the position where a choice must be made on pain of 
irrationality, because he has rejected the option not to engage in the indifferent choice 
situation, an auxiliary motive in the form of a random selection policy is the only way 
he can make a choice while leaving his rationality intact.
     Rescher sees things somewhat differently, however, and attempts to demonstrate 
the reasonableness of a random selection procedure via another route. He does this 
using the example of a man who has the choice between two ostensibly identical dates 
(an example drawn from Ghazali). There are, says Rescher, three courses of action 
open to such a man:
Course of action Reward
(1) To select neither date for lack of a preference Nothing
(2) To fix upon one of the dates by means of some selection One date
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      procedure which favors one over the other
(3) To select one of the dates at random One date
It is mandatory that some one of the trio be adopted, and impossible to adopt 
more than one: the procedures are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.14
Rescher observes that while options (2) and (3) lead to the same reward, (2) does so 
irrationally while (3) does not. Thus (3) is to be preferred. But by construing the 
matter in terms of potential rewards, Rescher is vulnerable to any number of 
‘Hobson’s choice’-type counterexamples that do not involve considerations of reward 
at all. For example, suppose a person is cornered by a psychopath and offered the 
choice of being shot through the left temple or right temple. To keep this example in 
line with that of Buridan’s ass, make the further assumption that the person does not 
want to be shot. On Rescher’s analysis, option (2) results in death, as does option (3), 
so opting for either of these alternatives would not lead to any obvious reward. This 
leaves option (1), to select neither alternative for lack of a preference. This certainly 
qualifies as the option involving the greatest reward, since in indifferent choice 
situations it is assumed that either alternative is brought about only if the chooser 
selects it, and if the chooser fails to make a choice then the status quo is maintained. 
So in this example the psychopath will only shoot the chooser if he opts for either (2) 
or (3), and for however long the chooser is paralysed by indecision he will remain 
alive. But this does not mean that Rescher’s option (1) is in any way rational in this 
case as it involves the chooser actually struggling to make a choice between equally 
bad alternatives (since being paralysed by indecision implies that the chooser does 
want to be able to make a choice). In fact the only rational option in this case is the 
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one Rescher does not permit, viz. deliberately choosing not to answer the psychopath 
on the grounds that the chooser just does not want to engage in the indifferent choice 
situation at all.
     The same applies if God’s creative options are exhausted by two equally dreadful 
worlds. Being good and wise God would simply choose not to create at all in this 
situation, and consequently would not be drawn into the knotty process of how best to 
make a choice between two worlds he does not want anyway. 
     Rescher’s attempt to ground the rationality of a choice made via a random 
selection procedure thus makes the unwarranted assumption that indifferent choice 
situations always involve potential rewards. But the bare bones paradox of indifferent 
choice does not discriminate between cases where the alternatives are equally good 
and cases where they are equally bad, and so the move to recommend a random 
selection procedure cannot unequivocally hinge on considerations of rewards as they 
are not always present. Therefore Rescher’s option (3) cannot be said to be rational 
per se, but only becomes rational once the chooser has elected to engage in the 
situation at hand.
     There is a further weakness in Rescher’s analysis that is worth noting, for it 
attempts to isolate the indifferent choice scenario from the real world, by assuming 
that the agent involved must make a choice between alternatives or be paralysed by 
deadlock, and overlooks the fact that the agent need not engage the situation at all if 
he does not want to. The analysis I have presented allows for the fact that the agent 
can simply ignore the alternatives on offer if he so wishes, which goes a long way 
towards putting indifferent choice situations in a real-life context.
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     Three kinds of random choice
     How, then, does the agent in an indifferent choice situation go about making a 
random choice? One way would be for him to choose whichever alternative he 
happens upon first, a solution proposed by the Aristotelian commentator Simplicius 
(‘Whatever happens first we choose first’).15 Rescher describes such an approach as 
‘wholly acceptable’ (on the grounds that we may consider the order in which the 
options are presented to be random), and for many indifferent choice scenarios it 
surely is. But while opting for the first-perceived alternative may well be an adequate 
approach for men and asses, it is unlikely to be a policy suitable for God, who is 
generally considered to be outside time. Hence when God surveys all possible worlds 
this is not done one after another, but all together. So it would be inappropriate to say 
that God happens upon one of the hypothetical unsurpassable worlds before the 
other(s). And since God considers all worlds from a timeless perspective it is clearly 
not open to him to select one on the basis that it is presented to him before any others 
of equal merit.
     Another possible way of making a random choice would be what we might call 
mere will. Championed by Bayle, this option involves the will simply making an 
arbitrary choice on the basis that man ‘is master is his own house, and...he does not 
depend upon objects.’16 Rescher appears in places to endorse this line, claiming that 
random decision-making is an ability possessed by the human mind, ‘since men are 
capable of making arbitrary selections, with respect to which they can be adequately 
certain in their own mind that the choice was made haphazardly, and without any 
“reasons” whatsoever.’17 There seem to me to be two ways of construing the notion of 
an arbitrary choice here. The first is to say that when agents make choices in ways 
considered to be arbitrary, they are in fact acting on reasons of which they themselves 
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are barely aware, if they are aware of them at all. A person acting under hypnotic 
suggestion or a subconscious motive could be said to be acting on such reasons. Now 
if an arbitrary choice is to be understood in this way, as a choice made on the basis of 
reasons which are barely (if at all) perceptible to the agent involved, then this is 
entirely satisfactory concept. Arbitrary choice would simply be a species of rational 
choice—choices based on sufficient reasons. So to call a choice arbitrary would be to 
say that there is a sufficient reason for the choice, though the agent is not fully 
cognisant of it. But of course arbitrary choice so conceived is not going to be 
employable in properly-constructed indifferent choice situations, as it requires that 
there be logically significant differences between the alternatives on offer, or at least 
that the agent perceives there to be so. Yet in a true indifferent choice scenario these 
differences or perceived differences are of course totally absent. Ergo, this notion of 
arbitrary choice is utterly unequipped to solve the problem of choice without 
preference.
     The second way of construing the notion of an arbitrary choice is to take it at face 
value and say that it simply involves choosing without any reasons at all. If this is 
what is meant by the expression ‘arbitrary choice’ then I am not convinced that the 
expression is intelligible. If we leave this complaint aside, and assume that agents do 
have the ability to make arbitrary choices in this sense, then we can say without fear 
of contradiction that any choice they would make using such an ability would not be 
in any way rational. For if the will could be moved without any reason(s) whatsoever, 
then it would be moved irrationally.18 So flattering oneself that one is ‘master in his 
own house’ and choosing arbitrarily would break the deadlock of an indifferent choice 
situation, but it would not conclude the matter in the way that we want, i.e. in a 
manner not entirely irrational. Thus it is not an appropriate option for God, even in the 
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event that his will has the capacity to be moved without reasons (which seems 
unlikely given that God is generally considered to be the most rational of beings, 
which would hardly be an appropriate epithet for a being capable of acting without 
any reason at all).19
     A third possible method of random choice has been put forward by Rescher. 
Developing a line first found in Bayle, he proposes that making use of a randomising 
device or a random selection procedure would be a reasonable way to break the 
deadlock in cases where one or more options are of equally good merit. This certainly 
does seem promising, for the random element is here external to the agent, and thus 
excuses his will from having to make a random choice. Rescher attempts to garner 
support for the reasonableness of the proposal by noting that leaving a ‘choice without 
preference’ matter in the hands of a randomising device or random selection policy 
‘has acquired the status of customary, official mode of resolution.’20 But once we 
swing the discussion back around to the issue at hand, that of God trying to choose 
which world to create when faced with two or more of equal merit, we are informed 
by Rescher that a problem emerges and that resorting to a random choice is entirely 
inappropriate for God. Why? Because, being omniscient, he will always foreknow the 
outcome of any random process.21 But this strikes me as highly doubtful. The 
hallmark of random event or mechanism is that the outcome is unknowable in 
advance. That is, what it is for something to be genuinely random is for it to be 
entirely unpredictable. Consequently many of the procedures and mechanisms we 
would call random (e.g. dice, roulette wheels, coin tosses) are only random to us, in 
that their outcomes are generally unknowable to us.22 But there seems to be no 
incoherence in the idea of a process or mechanism that is unknowable or 
unpredictable by its very nature. Such a process/mechanism would be truly random, in 
18
that once started it is impossible for any being to know what the outcome of it will be 
until it happens (so it would be the sort of process that just has no truth value for 
however long the process happens to last).23 No doubt some theists would argue that 
such an idea is incoherent, because God’s omniscience rules out there being any 
process or thing that is unknowable by its own nature. Such reasoning would be 
unconvincing, I think, because the notion of a process whose outcome is unknowable 
even to God seems to have a vaguely analogous parallel with free beings—beings that 
by their very nature are uncontrollable, even by God. Now it seems to me that if there 
are things that do not fall under the scope of God’s power, i.e. free beings that he 
cannot control, then there might also be things, not necessarily the same things, that 
do not fall under the scope of his knowledge, e.g. things or processes which are just 
inherently unknowable. So just as God’s omnipotence is not circumscribed by his 
creation of things over which he has no subsequent control, so his omniscience is not 
circumscribed by his instigation of a process or mechanism whose outcome it is 
logically impossible for him to foreknow. Thus there does not seem to be any 
contradiction in the notion of a process or mechanism that is by its very nature 
unknowable, that is, a process or mechanism that is truly random, and if that is so then 
it seems God could have recourse to it in order to break the deadlock of an indifferent 
choice.
     The problem of association
     But while the notion of a truly random process seems coherent in itself, it is 
possible to object to its use in indifferent choice situations. This objection can be 
traced back at least as far as Leibniz, who levels it in the following way: suppose we 
were to decide an indifferent choice situation by flipping a coin, for example. To do 
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that, he observes, ‘There would have to be a reason to attribute heads to one [option] 
and tails to the other rather than the contrary.’24 But of course there is no good reason 
to make such an attribution, and since the process of attribution is itself an indifferent 
choice we very quickly find ourselves heading towards an infinite regress. The same 
problem is going to occur with other procedures too, such as drawing straws, throwing 
dice etc.
     Rescher is aware of this problem―though he seems not to be aware that it is to be 
found in Leibniz―and suggests that it can be resolved by what he calls 
‘convenience.’ This is where, for example, the chooser accepts the first option 
presented (or the last, or the penultimate, etc.) on the basis that it is the most 
convenient thing to do. The chooser can do this, argues Rescher, on the grounds that 
‘the order-of-mention (or indication) can be taken, by the defining hypothesis of the 
problem, to be a random ordering.’25 In circumstances where the alternatives can be 
considered to be randomly ordered, the use of a further random selection policy is 
strictly not necessary at all, he argues, and one can just choose whichever alternative 
is the most convenient (however defined). I shall not consider this suggestion further, 
being content to mention in passing that it appears to involve an indifferent choice of 
its own, for the decision whether to nominate the first-presented option or last-
presented option as the most convenient must be made before the options are 
presented (since choosing the first-presented or last-presented must form part of a 
consistent policy, as Rescher notes, and not be liable to amendment every time an 
indifferent choice situation arises).26 In any case, whatever merit Rescher’s proposal 
has, it is clear again that it would not be suitable for God’s purposes since possible 
worlds cannot be said to be in any kind of ordering whatsoever (as they are not 
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surveyed in either time or space). So there would seem to be no method of convenient 
selection open to God.
     This ought not to be considered a particularly great setback, however. For it needs 
to be noted that Leibniz’s problem of association only applies to particular selection 
methods, such as tossing a coin, throwing dice or drawing straws, as in each of these 
methods an association clearly has to be made between the instruments (or parts of 
instruments) used and the choice-alternatives that they are supposed to represent. But 
the problem of association does not arise with every type of selection procedure that 
we would consider to be random. For instance, if I were presented with a choice 
between two dates I could put them in a lottery ball selection machine and let that 
select one for me. No association is required with this method as the selection is 
direct rather than indirect, as it is with coins, straws and dice. Likewise one can 
imagine a selection device that just randomly points in a particular direction. Again, if 
one’s random selection policy involved using such a device then one would not be 
troubled with the matter of associating the choice-alternatives to the means of 
selection, as no association would be required. Since there are means of selection that 
do not require any form of association we can therefore suppose that whatever 
selection policy God happens to favour, it would not be one that requires association.
     This is not to say, of course, that God would use some kind of cosmic lottery 
machine. None of the means of selection we have mentioned thus far―coins, straws, 
dice, lottery machines etc.―are plausible candidates for a divine random selection 
procedure as, notwithstanding the fact that none of them are truly random in the sense 
of their having outcomes that are logically unknowable in advance, they are all very 
much rooted in the spatio-temporal world, whereas God is not. It is God’s 
extramundane-ness that makes it extremely difficult to figure out the sort of random 
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procedure he could use, as it would obviously be some procedure utterly unlike any 
we employ.27 For one thing, all of our random procedures, which as I have mentioned 
are not really random at all, absolutely speaking, are physical in nature. God, 
however, is not restricted to selection procedures involving physical objects. I remain 
silent as to whether an appropriate divine random selection procedure would be 
physical or non-physical in nature, as for our purposes I do not think it matters much 
either way (since God, after all, could avail himself of any random selection 
procedure, physical or otherwise). Accordingly, all references to a ‘random 
procedure’ or ‘random mechanism’ should henceforth not be taken narrowly to refer 
to a procedure or a mechanism that is physical, but rather to some kind of process or 
method, however instituted, of making a random selection, where this process or 
method is not simply a random movement of the will (which, as I have noted, is 
irrational, and thus not in accordance with God’s supreme rationality).
     Now the important point to glean from all this is as follows: the problem of 
association only arises with some selection procedures, and those in which it does 
arise are (a) random to us, but not random per se, and (b) physical in nature. On this 
basis I cannot see that we have any good reason to suppose that the problem of 
association would arise for a selection procedure that (a) is genuinely random, and (b) 
may or may not be physical in nature. Moreover, there seems to be no obvious 
contradiction inherent in the notion of a truly random selection procedure that does 
not suffer from the problem of association, and on that basis I submit that such a thing 
is possible. In which case God would be able to make use of it should he find that 
there is more than one possible world of unsurpassable goodness.
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     A further problem of multiple choice  
     However even if we allow that there is such a thing as a truly random selection 
procedure that does not suffer from the aforementioned problem of association, the 
problem of how God can choose one world from several equally good alternatives 
does not necessarily end there. For prima facie it seems possible that there will be 
more than one such procedure available to God, and if there are many such procedures 
then it is possible, and even quite likely, that some or even all of them will be equally 
good but not bettered by any other. If we suppose for the sake of argument that there 
are 10 equally good (and unsurpassable) procedures that God could employ, it is clear 
that God is faced with yet another indifferent choice scenario, for he needs to choose 
one random procedure out of 10 in order to whittle down his choice of equally good 
worlds. But he has no reason to select any of the random procedures over the others, 
since all are ex hypothesi equally good. So if we allow that there might be more than 
one random selection procedure open to God, then not only is he once again faced 
with an indifferent choice (this time between random selection procedures), but this 
time he has no means by which he can rationally break the deadlock, because his 
method of breaking the deadlock in indifferent choice situations, i.e. employing a 
random selection procedure, is in fact the cause of this particular indifferent choice 
problem.
     As stated, the problem seems insuperable. But in fact it is not, for there is a 
significant difference between having to make a choice between equally good worlds 
and equally good random selection procedures, and it is this: in the case of worlds, 
God can only choose one, but in the case of random selection procedures there is 
nothing to stop him choosing them all. A little explanation will make this clear. 
Logically, of course, God can only choose one world (i.e. universe), for it is literally 
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impossible for him to create more than one. There is thus a logical restriction on the 
number of worlds he can create. A similar restriction is present in some forms of the 
indifferent choice paradox too, e.g. Buridan’s ass can only choose to go in one 
direction at a time, and is artificially built in to other forms of the paradox, e.g. a 
person offered two dollar bills is only permitted to take one of them. But no such 
restriction applies to random selection procedures since it is logically possible to 
select them all. So if God is faced with 10 different-but-equally-good random 
selection procedures to choose from, there is nothing to prevent him from selecting 
them all in the way that there is something preventing him from selecting all equally 
best worlds. And the decision to select all available random procedures can hardly be 
said to be an irrational act either, unlike the remainder of God’s options, which are to 
choose none of the procedures, or just one of them (for which he would of course 
have no reason at all). So if there are 10 procedures, God can simply select and run 
them all, and then pool the results. If one of the equally best worlds is selected more 
often than any other, then that is the world he creates, and if the combined results of 
all the random procedures do not favour any one world over the others then God can 
simply run all of them again until a clear winner does emerge.
     It seems not unreasonable, then, that in the event of his being faced with two or 
more unsurpassable worlds God could have recourse to one or more random selection 
procedures in order to choose between them. To the unpersuaded, I shall note only 
this—if for some reason it is not possible for God to arbitrarily select for creation one 
from two or more equally meritorious unsurpassable possible worlds, then presumably 
it was not required of him anyway. We can be confident of this because we know that 
there is a world. Therefore if the optimist is right that God will choose a world 
unsurpassable by any others, then clearly one of two possible scenarios obtained: (1) 
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God found only one unsurpassable world among all those possible, and actualised it 
on the grounds that it was the best, or (2) There were two or more unsurpassable 
worlds, and God was able to choose between them.
     A third scenario would no doubt be urged by many—that God did not make an 
unsurpassable world at all, on the grounds that the very concept of an unsurpassable 
world is incoherent.28 To that I would respond: if there is no such thing as a world 
unsurpassable in merit, then the problem of how God can make a rational choice of 
world is even more thorny than in the scenario we have been discussing. For if God is 
faced with an unbounded infinity of possible worlds, with no limit to how meritorious 
a world can be, then for whichever world he chooses there is always another that is 
better, and clearly he will have no overriding reason to make any of them. And the 
need to uncover a rational selection procedure is very pressing indeed if one rejects 
the notion of an unsurpassable world, as is evidenced by the efforts of Robert Adams, 
Francis & Daniel Howard-Snyder and Richard Swinburne, who have all attempted, 
unsuccessfully in my view, to develop one.29 Where there is no best possible world, 
only an infinite series of them ascending in merit, one struggles to imagine what 
possible reason God could have to settle for any of the choices on offer, knowing full 
well that many superior worlds are available. At least the optimist appears to be on 
firmer ground when it comes to explaining how God made his choice.
     Thus we may say that if God were faced with two possible worlds of equal merit 
and unsurpassed by no other possible worlds, he would choose one of them for 
creation via a random selection procedure. This is because, contra Leibniz, choosing 
one this way, either one, would be the rational thing to do.30
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